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Abstract—Avionics networks rely on a set of stringent relia-
bility and safety requirements. In existing deployments, most of
these networks are based on a wired technology, which supports
these requirements. Furthermore, this technology simplifies the
security management of the network since certain assumptions
can be safely made, including the inability of an attacker to
access the network, and the fact that it is almost impossible
for an attacker to introduce a node into the network. The
proposal for Avionics Wireless Networks (AWNs, currently under
consideration by multiple aerospace working groups, promises a
reduction in the complexity of electrical wiring harness design
and fabrication, a reduction in the total weight of wires, increased
customization possibilities, and the capacity to monitor otherwise
inaccessible moving or rotating aircraft parts such as landing
gear and some sections of the aircraft engines. While providing
these benefits, the AWN must ensure that it provides levels
of safety that are at minimum equivalent to those offered
by the wired equivalent. In this paper, we propose a secure
and trusted channel protocol that satisfies the stated security
and operational requirements for an AWN protocol. There are
three main objectives for this protocol. First, the protocol has
to provide the assurance that all communicating entities can
trust each other, and can trust their internal (secure) software
and hardware states. Second, the protocol has to establish a
fair key exchange between all communicating entities so as to
provide a secure channel. Finally, the third objective is to be
efficient for both the initial start-up of the network and when
resuming a session after a cold and/or warm restart of a node.
The proposed protocol is implemented within a demo AWN,
and performance measurements are presented based on this
implementation. In addition, we formally verify our proposed
protocol using CasperFDR.
I. INTRODUCTION
A modern aircraft can be considered as a highly reliable and
mission-critical digital network in the air. The Aircraft Data
Network (ADN) interconnects different aircraft sub-systems,
including flight control, the crew network and the passenger
entertainment network. In recent years investigations into the
feasibility of moving some non-critical networks from wired
technology to wireless-based technology have been carried
out. Such a network is referred to as an Avionics Wireless
Network (AWN), which is the main focus of this paper.
Whatever the network deployment topology and the com-
munication technology that are used, one element is common:
the physical wire that connects two or more avionics sub-
systems. Wiring an aircraft can be costly in that it includes
wiring harness designs, cable fabrication and the associated
cost of additional weight. Furthermore, to provide dual re-
dundancy, these wires have to connect any two devices by
means of two physically separate paths in the aircraft. Wires
and related connectors potentially represent 2-5 percent of
an aircraft’s weight [1]. As the wiring of an aircraft is a
time- and labor-intensive activity, post-deployment upgrades or
installation of new wire routes or new avionics sub-systems
may be costly [2]. As reported by [1], roughly 30 percent
of wires are potential candidates for wireless substitutes.
Therefore, as highlighted in [3], wireless solutions have more
than reasonable prospects as long as security, safety and high
reliability can be maintained.
Whether an ADN or an AWN is used, the main objective is
to communicate data between aircraft sub-systems in a secure,
reliable and efficient manner. Going wireless brings its own
set of unique challenges, among which a major one is to
ensure the confidentiality and integrity of communications;
any attacker within wireless range of the AWN can easily
eavesdrop and/or (potentially) modify the exchanged informa-
tion. To protect against such an attack, we require a strong,
efficient and trustworthy mechanism to establish secure links
between the communicating nodes in an AWN. Secure channel
protocols can be used for this purpose, and in this paper we
propose such a protocol for AWN environments. In this paper,
we are not going to discuss the wireless jamming attacks.
Although they are a valid threat but they do not directly attack
the confidentiality and integrity of communication channel -
wireless jamming attack is a thread to channel availability. For
this reason they are beyond the scope of this paper.
A. Contribution
In this paper, our main goals are to propose a secure and
trusted channel protocol for AWNs, and to compare its security
and performance with several other existing protocols.
The salient contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) proposing a Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (STCP)
that along with establishing a secure channel between
the communicating entities (end-points) also provides
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security assurance that each end-point is secure and
trusted;
2) defining comparison criteria for secure channel protocols
along with the related security and performance analysis;
3) validating the proposed protocol with a formal tool,
CasperFDR and producing an implementation in a real
AWN to enable measurements to be obtained.
B. Structure of the Paper
Section II briefly presents the rationale behind this paper
and the existing work carried out in the avionics industry (in
the context of AWNs) and secure channel protocols from a
traditional computer security perspective. In section III, we
look into how a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) can provide
a trusted boot that is then used to assure communication
partners that the device is secure and trustworthy. Section
IV discussed the security comparison criteria and then the
proposed protocol. In section V, we first analyze the proposed
protocol informally, than formally using CasperFDR and we
compare it with different protocols based on the security
comparison criteria previously defined. Finally in section VI
we present future research directions and conclude the paper.
II. RATIONALE AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the rationale behind the proposed
protocol and review the existing work in two different areas:
AWNs and Secure Channel Protocols (SCPs).
A. Rationale
A Secure Channel Protocol (SCP) by definition provides ei-
ther or both of entity authentication and key exchange between
communicating parties (end points). An SCP preserves the
confidentiality and integrity of the messages on the considered
channel but not at the end points.
Nevertheless, there can be implicit assurance in the integrity
and security of the end points as described by ETSI TS
102 412 [4] in the domain of the smart card industry. This
document states that the smart card is a secure end point
under the assumption that it is a tamper-resistant device. This
type of assurance can be extrapolated to other devices that are
implicitly trusted because of offline business relationships or
because of a property of the device itself.
However, for a critical system like avionics it is not just
implicit trust that should be required but also explicit trust
validation, to counter any potential threat. The explicit trust
assurance should be provided by the (aircraft) device that is
participating in the AWN communication. This would build in
an assurance that only secure and trusted devices (explicitly
trusted devices with per-protocol run assurance) will partic-
ipate in the AWN, potentially countering physically altered
devices and/or re-introduction of a decommissioned device as
discussed in [3, 5].
In contrast, in the ADN, the assumption of implicit assur-
ance might be valid. However, for a robust security and re-
liability mechanism an explicit security assurance mechanism
should be considered.
A trusted channel is a secure channel that is cryptograph-
ically bounded to the current state of the communicating
parties [6]. This state can be a hardware and/or a software
configuration, and ideally it requires a trustworthy component
to validate it is effectively as claimed. Such a component, in
most instances, is a TPM [7] as demonstrated in [8]–[10]
In an AWN, individual devices will have prior relation-
ships with each other: in the avionics industry any system
deployment is stringently controlled, regulated and protected.
Therefore, assuming that one single trusted entity would
deploy the AWN environment is as per the avionics indus-
try’s practice. However, when establishing a secure channel,
individual devices should still ensure that they are not only
communicating with an authenticated device but also that the
current state of this device is secure.
B. Related Work on AWN Security Concerns
Security and trust have been subject to some analysis
by both the academic community and the industry. A brief
overview of aircraft information security and some improve-
ments were proposed in [11]. Security assurance research from
airplane production to airplane operation was presented in
[12, 13]. A general discussion of the security issues related
to the aircraft network and aircrafts’ connectivity with the
Internet is provided in [14], while [15, 16] discusses the impact
of WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks) and related security
concerns in aircraft. Security and safety are intrinsically linked
to each other in general and specifically in the context of
the aviation industry [17]–[19]. The application and impact of
cryptography, especially public key cryptography for avionics
networks, was evaluated in [20].
The management of security and the general deployment of
AWNs based on wireless-as-a-comm-link have been analyzed
in [3], which discusses the security and trust challenges faced
by AWNs. In addition, a crucial component that supports
aircraft devices security is the trusted boot process discussed
in [5]. The security, trust and assurance issues related to the
fact of bringing a user device into an aircraft network are
evaluated in [21].
C. Related Work on Secure Channel Protocols
In this section, we restrict the discussion to the protocols
that are proposed for general-purpose computing environments
or to those that are used as points of comparison in the
discussions to come.
The concept of trusted channel protocols was proposed by
Gasmi et al. [6] along with the adaptation of the TLS protocol
[22]. Later Armknecht et al. [9] proposed another adaptation
of OpenSSL to accommodate the concept of trusted channels;
similarly, Zhou and Zhang [8] also proposed an SSL-based
trusted channel protocol.
In section V-B, we will compare the proposed STCP with
the existing protocols. These protocols include the Station-
to-Station (STS) protocol [23], the Aziz-Diffie (AD) protocol
[24], the ASPeCT protocol [25], Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) [26],
trusted TLS (T2LS) [6], GlobalPlatform SCP81 [27], the
Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) protocol [28], and the Sirett-
Mayes (SM) protocol [29].
This selection of protocols is intentionally broad so as to
include well-established protocols like STS, AD and JFK.
We also include the ASPeCT protocol, which is designed
specifically for mobile networks’ value-added services. Similar
to our proposal where we require trust assurance during the
protocol run, T2LS meets this as it provides trust assurance,
whereas other protocols like SCP81, SM, and MM are spe-
cific to smart cards and are representative embedded low-
power devices. In addition, we have included the secure and
trusted channel protocol, P-STCP [10], which is designed for
resource-restricted and security-sensitive environments, and
has some similar design requirements to those of the proposed
protocol.
III. TRUSTING A DEVICE (TRUSTED BOOT)
In this section, we discuss how a TPM provides a secure
boot process and how it provides assurance to external entities
that the device is secure and trustworthy.
A. Trusted Platform Module
The TPM is a trusted, reliable and tamper-resistant compo-
nent that can provide trustworthy evidence of the state of a
given system on which it is present. The interpretation of this
evidence is neither controlled nor dictated by the TPM but by
the entity receiving and thus assessing it. Trust in this context
can be defined as an expectation that the state of a system is as
it is supposed to be, i.e. secure. Therefore, in a very simplistic
sense a TPM is a trustworthy reporting agent (witness), not
an evaluator or an enforcer of security policies. In the field
of trusted computing, this is referred to as providing a root of
trust on which an inquisitor relies to validate the current state
of a system.
For in-depth discussion of the architecture of TPMs and
their functionality please refer to [7]. In this paper, we focus
on the secure boot process as it is carried out by the TPM and
as discussed in the subsequent section.
B. Secure Boot (TPM Integrity Measurement Operation)
When a device with a TPM boots up, the first component
to power up is the system BIOS (Basic Input/output System).
On a trusted platform (a platform that contains a TPM), the
boot sequence is initiated by the Core BIOS (i.e. CRTM: Core
Root of Trust Measurement), which first measures its own
integrity. This measurement is stored in PCR01 and it is later
extended to include the integrity measurement of the rest of
the BIOS. The Core BIOS then measures the circuit-board’s
1A Platform Configuration Register (PCR) is a 160-bit (20 bytes) data
element that stores the result of the integrity measurement, which is a
generated hash of a given component (e.g. the BIOS, the operating system, or
an application). A group of PCRs form the integrity matrix. The process of
extending PCR values is as follows: PCRi = Hash(PCR
′
i||X), where i
is the PCR index, PCR
′
i represents the old value stored at index i, and X is
the sequence to be included in the PCR value. “||” indicates the concatenation
of two data elements in the given order. The starting value of all PCRs is zero.
Trusted Building Block (TBB) and Roots of Trust
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Figure 1. Trusted Platform Boot Sequence (figure from [30])
(motherboard) configuration setting2, and this value is stored
in PCR1. After these measurements, the Core BIOS loads the
rest of the code of the BIOS.
The BIOS will subsequently measure the integrity of the
ROM firmware and of the ROM firmware configuration,
storing them in PCR2 and PCR3 respectively. At this stage, the
base configuration of a device is established and the CRTM
will proceed with integrity measurement and loading of the
Operating System (OS).
The CRTM measures the integrity of the “OS Loader Code”,
also termed the Initial Program Loader (IPL), and stores the
measurement in the relevant PCR. The designated PCR index
is left to the discretion of the OS developers. Subsequently, the
device will execute the “OS Loader Code” and if successful,
the TPM will measure the integrity of the “OS Code”. After
this measurement is made and stored, the “OS Code” executes.
Finally, the relevant software that initiates its execution will
first be subjected to an integrity measurement, and the resulting
value will be stored in a PCR and then the software will be
allowed to execute. This process is shown in Figure 1, which
illustrates the execution flow and the storage of the integrity
measurements.
By creating a chain of integrity measurements, a TPM
provides a trusted and reliable view of the current state of
the system. Any piece of software, whether part of the OS or
an application, has an integrity measurement stored in a PCR
at a particular index.
As discussed above, a TPM does not make any decisions:
it only measures, stores, and reports integrity measurements
in a secure and reliable manner. When a TPM reports an
2To measure that correct hardware configuration was present at boot time.
integrity measurement, it is recommended that it generates
a signature on the value, thus avoiding replay and man-in-
the-middle attacks [7]. The process by which an inquisitor
can request a device attestation and how a TPM provides this
evidence is discussed in the next section.
Reporting and Attestation Operations: The attestation pro-
cess, whether initiated by the relevant external entity (includ-
ing human users or other devices) locally or remotely, involves
the generation of a signature by the TPM using the Attestation
Identification Key (AIK) of the (associated/requested) PCR
values [30]. The signature assures the requesting entity of the
validity of the integrity measurement stored in the PCRs. The
choice of the AIK and PCR index is dependent on the device,
OS or application developer.
The signature key and PCR values are stored in a tamper-
resistant memory inside the TPM. Therefore, an attacker
would have to circumvent the tamper-resistant property of the
TPM to impact the outcome of this attestation process.
IV. SECURE AND TRUSTED CHANNEL PROTOCOL
In this section, we begin the discussion with the security
comparison criteria, followed by the protocol notation, pre-
setup and then the actual protocol proposal. This section
concludes with a discussion of how the secure channel is
re-established if one of the devices is restarted or resets the
protocol.
A. Security Comparison Criteria
For a protocol to support the AWN framework, it should
meet, at minimum, the security and operational requirements
listed below:
G1) Mutual Entity Authentication: All nodes in the network
should be able to authenticate to each other to avoid
masquerading by a malicious entity.
G2) Asymmetric Architecture: Exchange of certified public
keys between the entities to facilitate the key generation
and entity authentication process.
G3) Mutual Key Agreement: Communicating parties will
agree on the generation of a key during the protocol run.
G4) Joint Key Control: Communicating parties will mutually
control the generation of new keys to avoid one party
choosing weak keys or predetermining any portion of the
session key.
G5) Key Freshness: The generated key will be fresh to the
protocol session to protect against replay attacks.
G6) Mutual Key Confirmation: Communicating parties will
provide implicit or explicit confirmation that they have
generated the same keys during a protocol run.
G7) Known-Key Security: If a malicious user is able to ob-
tain the session key of a particular protocol run, it should
not enable him to retrieve long-term secrets (private keys)
or session keys (future and past).
G8) Unknown Key Share Resilience: In the event of an
unknown key share attack, an entity X believes that it
has shared a key with Y , where the entity Y mistakenly
believes that it has shared the key with entity Z 6= X .
Proposed protocols should adequately protect against this
attack.
G9) Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience: If
a malicious user retrieves the long-term key of an entity
Y , it will enable him to impersonate Y . Nevertheless, key
compromise should not enable him to impersonate other
entities to Y [31].
G10) Perfect Forward Secrecy: If the long-term keys of com-
municating entities are compromised, this will not enable
a malicious user to compromise previously generated
session keys.
G11) Mutual Non-Repudiation: Communicating entities will
not be able to deny that they have executed a protocol
run with each other.
G12) Partial Chosen Key (PCK) Attack Resilience: Proto-
cols that claim to provide joint key control are susceptible
to this type of attack [32]. In this type of attack, if
two entities provide separate values to the key gener-
ation function then one entity has to communicate its
contribution value to the other. The second entity can
then compute the value of its contribution in such a way
that it can dictate its strength (i.e. it is able to generate
a partially weak key). However, this attack depends
upon the computational capabilities of the second entity.
Therefore, proposed protocols should adequately prevent
PCK attack.
G13) Trust Assurance (Trustworthiness): The communicat-
ing parties not only provide security and operation as-
surance but also validation proofs that are dynamically
generated during the protocol execution.
G14) Denial-of-Service (DoS) Prevention: The protocol
should not require the individual nodes to allocate a large
set of resources to the extent that it might contribute to
a DoS attack.
G15) Privacy: A third party should not be able to know the
identities of the AWN nodes.
For a formal definition of the terms (italicized) used in the
above list, the reader is referred to [33]. The requirements
listed above are later used as a point of reference to compare
the selected protocols in Table III.
For the performance evaluation that we have conducted, the
main measurements are related to the time required to establish
a secure channel once the wireless link is established and they
are discussed in section V-C.
B. Protocol Notation
The notations used in the protocol description are listed in
Table II;
C. Pre-Protocol Setup
The proposed protocol requires certain pre-protocol setup
operations as listed below:
1) Each aircraft device that is part of the AWN has a TPM.
2) Each device in the AWN is pre-configured with the
signature verification keys of its communication partners
(i.e. public keys of other aircraft devices).
Table I
SECURE AND TRUSTED CHANNEL PROTOCOL (STCP).
1. AD1→ AD2 : AD1i‖AD2i‖NAD1‖grAD1‖V RAD1−AD2‖SCookie
2. AD2→ AD1 : AD2i‖AD1i‖NAD2‖grAD2‖[SignAD2(AD2−Data)‖SignTPMAD2 (AD2− V alidation)]KeKa‖V RAD2−AD1‖SCookie
: AD2−Data = H(AD2i‖AD1i‖grAD1‖grAD2‖NAD1‖NAD2)
: AD2− V alidation = SASAD2−AD1‖NAD1‖NAD2
3. AD1→ AD2 : [SignAD1(AD1−Data)‖SignTPMAD1 (AD1− V alidation)]KeKa‖SCookie
: AD1−Data = H(AD1i‖AD2i‖grAD2‖grAD1‖NAD2‖NAD1)
: AD1− V alidation = SASAD1−AD2‖NAD2‖NAD1
Table II
NOTATION USED IN PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION.
AD1 : Denotes an aircraft device ’1’.
AD2 : Denotes an aircraft device ’2’.
A→ B : Message sent by an entity A to an entity B.
TPMX : Denotes a TPM of an entity X
Xi : Represents the identity of an entity X .
grX : Diffie-Hellman exponential generated by an entity X .
NX : Random number generated by an entity X .
X‖Y : Represents the concatenation of the data items X, Y
in the given order.
[M ]KeKa : Message M is encrypted by the session encryption
key Ke and then MAC is computed using the session
MAC key Ka. Both keys Ke and Ka are generated
during the protocol run.
SignX(Z) : Signature generated on data Z by the entity X using
a signature algorithm [34].
H(Z) : Is the result of generating a hash of data Z.
Hk(Z) : Result of generating a keyed hash of data Z using key
k.
SCookie : Session cookie generated by one of the communica-
tion entities. It indicates the session information and
facilitates protection against DoS attacks along with
(possibly) providing the protocol session resumption
facility.
V RA−B : Validation request sent by entity A to entity B. In
response entity B provides a security and reliability
assurance to entity A.
SASA−B : Security assurance (PCR values) generation by entity
A that provides trust validation to the requesting entity
B.
3) Each device is also pre-configured with the signature
verification keys of the TPMs of its communication
partners (i.e. the public key corresponding to the AIK key
used to sign the PCR values stored in the TPM) along
with their own trusted and secure PCR values (i.e. the
values for their trusted and secure state).
D. Proposed Protocol
The messages of the protocol are listed in Table I and
described below.
a) Message 1: The AD1 generates a random number
NAD1 and computes the Diffie-Hellman exponential grAD1 .
The “H(grAD1‖NAD1‖AD1i‖AD2i)” serves as a session
cookie “SCookie”, and it is appended to each subsequent
message sent by both devices. It indicates the session informa-
tion, facilitates protection against DoS attacks and (possibly)
provides the protocol session resumption facility, which is
required if a protocol run is interrupted before it successfully
concludes. Finally, AD1 will request AD2 to provide assurance
of its current state.
b) Message 2: In response, AD2 generates a ran-
dom number, and a Diffie-Hellman exponential grAD2 . It
can then calculate the kDH = (grAD1)rAD2 (mod n)
which will be the shared secret from which the rest of the
keys will be generated. The encryption key is generated
as Ke = HkDH (NAD1‖NAD2‖′′1′′) and a MAC key as
Ka = HkDH (NAD1‖NAD2‖′′2′′). We can further generate
(session) keys in a similar manner for data stream-specific
virtual links3 (VLs) for managing the communication between
different aircraft sub-systems.
Subsequently, the TPM generates a state validation message
signed by the TPM AIK key represented in the protocol as
“SignTPMAD2(AD2 − V alidation)”. AD2 will also request
AD1 to provide assurance of its current state.
On receipt of this message, AD1 will first generate the ses-
sion keys. AD1 will then verify AD2’s signature and validation
proof generated by the TPM of AD2. As the signature key
belongs to the TPM of AD2, an attacker cannot masquerade
this signature. By verifying the signature, AD1 can ascertain
the current state (PCR value) is measured by the TPM of
AD2. Now AD1 can verify whether the PCR value represents
a trusted and secure state or not. Since our protocol pre-setup
AD1 would have the PCR value of a trusted and secure state
of AD2.
Furthermore, AD1 will check the values of Diffie-Hellman
exponentials (i.e. grAD1 and grAD2 ) and of the generated ran-
dom numbers to avoid main-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
c) Message 3: AD1 will then generate a message similar
to message 2, a signature by AD1 and trust validation proof
generated by its TPM.
On receipt of the message, AD2 will verify the trust
validation proof and generate keys. Furthermore, AD2 will
also check the values of the Diffie-Hellman exponentials and
of the generated random numbers to avoid man-in-the-middle
and replay attacks.
E. Post-Protocol Process
The shared material generated from the Diffie-Hellman
exponential can be used to generate more keys than just the
session encryption and MAC keys of the protocol. If this
is not desirable then session encryption and MAC keys can
be saved as master session keys. Individual VL keys can
3Virtual Links (VLs): Each communication relationship in an aircraft
network is represented as a VL. In our proposal we assume that a pair of
communication parties would have two uni-directional VLs and each VL will
have its own session key.
then be generated from these session keys. Based on the
security policies related to the VLs, whether they require only
confidentiality or integrity or both, these two master session
keys can be used to generate VL specific encryption and MAC
keys.
F. Protocol Resumption
As discussed in [3], secure channel protocols only run
when an aircraft is stationary on the ground, with proofs that
the aircraft is not in flight based on geo-location, proximity
to airport, weight on wheels, etc. The proposed protocol
would run before each flight and master session keys are
only valid for a single flight. The protocol should not be
executed during the flight. Therefore, if a device has to reset
due to some unforeseeable situation, a safety procedure to
resume the secure channel and all of the associated VL keys
- without running the protocol - must exist. For this purpose,
each individual device will save the master session keys in
its persistent storage and will have a standard algorithm to
generate the keys for each of the VLs. If the master session
keys are lost, then, during that particular flight, the device
would be out of communication. To avoid this, the master
session keys should be stored on two different memories (each
aircraft device has at least two separate storage media, so as
to provide this dual storage redundancy).
V. PROTOCOL EVALUATION
In this section, we first discuss the information analysis
of the protocols, and then compare different protocols with
our proposal based on the comparison criteria defined above.
Finally, we provide some implementation results and a formal
analysis using CasperFDR.
A. Brief Information Analysis
Throughout this section, we refer to the protocol comparison
criteria of section IV-A by their respective numbers as listed
in the same section.
During the proposed protocol, in messages 2 and 3 the
communicating entities authenticate each other, which satis-
fies G1. Similarly, for G2, all communicating entities have
exchanged cryptographic certificates to facilitate an authenti-
cation and trust validation proof (generated and signed by the
TPM) before the aircraft devices are deployed (pre-deployment
configuration).
The proposed protocol satisfies requirements G3, G4, G5
and G12 by first requiring AD1 and AD2 to generate the
Diffie-Hellman exponential; thus computational cost is equal
on both sides. Similarly, exponential generation also assures
that both devices will have equal input to the key generation.
Messages 2 and 3 are encrypted used the keys generated
during the protocol, thus providing mutual key confirmation
(satisfying G6).
In the proposed protocol, session keys generated in one
session have no link with the session keys generated in other
sessions, even when the session is established between the
same devices. This enables the protocol to provide resilience
against known-key security (G7). This unlinkability of session
keys is based on the fact that each entity not only generates
a new Diffie-Hellman exponential but also a random number,
both of which are used during the protocol for key generation.
Therefore, even if an adversary “A” finds out about the
exponential and random numbers of a particular session, it
will not enable him to generate past or future session keys.
Furthermore, to provide unknown key share resilience (G8),
the proposed protocol includes the Diffie-Hellman exponen-
tials along with generated random numbers and each commu-
nicating entity then signs them. Therefore, the receiving entity
can then ascertain the identity of the entity with which it has
shared the key.
The protocol can be considered to be a KCI-resilient (G9)
protocol, as protection against the KCI is based on the digital
signatures. In addition, the cryptographic certificates of each
signature key also include its association with a particular
device. Therefore, if A has knowledge of the signature key
of a device, it can only masquerade this particular device to
other devices but not others to it.
The proposed protocol also meets the requirement for
perfect forward secrecy (G10) by making the key generation
process independent of any long-term keys. The session keys
are generated using fresh values of Diffie-Hellman exponen-
tials and random numbers, regardless of the long term keys:
they are signature keys. Therefore, even if eventually A finds
out the signature key of any entity it will not enable him to
determine past session keys. This independence of long term
secrets from the session key generation process also enables
the protocol to satisfy G7.
Communicating entities in the STCP share signed messages
with each other that include the session information, thus
providing mutual non-repudiation (G11). G14 is ensured by
the inclusion in the protocol of the session cookie, which
provides a limited protection against DoS, and by the fact that
individual devices have pre-configurations of communication
partners which enable them to drop a connection if an entity
trying to connect with them is not able to authenticate.
To satisfy G15, the device identities are basically a random
string that should not have any link with the function of the
device. This would hinder an attacker from eavesdropping a
protocol run to determine which aircraft device is communi-
cating on the wireless channel.
Finally, TPMs on all communicating devices provide trust
validation proof in the form of PCR values signed by the TPM
AIK. This provides mutual validation of the trust between
communicating devices, confirming that the other device is
functioning in a secure and reliable state (G13).
B. Revisiting the Requirements and Goals
Table III provides a comparison between the listed protocols
in section II-C with the proposed protocol in terms of the
required goals (see section IV-A).
As shown in Table III, the STS protocol meets the first
eleven goals. The main issue with the STS protocol is that
it does not provide adequate protection against partial chosen
Table III
PROTOCOL COMPARISON ON THE BASIS OF THE STATED GOALS (SEE SECTION IV-A.)
Goals ProtocolsSTS AD ASPeCT JFK T2LS SCP81 MM SM Asymmetric TKDF P-STCP SSH SSL Proposed Protocol
G1. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ (∗) ∗ ∗
G2. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G3. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G4. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ (∗) ∗ −∗ ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
G5. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G6. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G7. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G8. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G9. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G10. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G11. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G12. (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G13. (∗) (∗) ∗ −∗ ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
G14. ∗ (∗) ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
G15. (∗) ∗ ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
Note: ∗ means that the protocol meets the stated goal, (∗) shows that the protocol can be modified to satisfy the requirement, and −∗ means that the protocol
(implicitly) meets the requirement not because of the protocol messages but because of the prior relationship between the communicating entities.
key attacks (G12) and privacy protection (G15). The remaining
goals are not met by the STS because of the design architecture
and deployment environment, which did not require these
goals. Similarly, the AD protocol does not meet G6, G10 and
G13-G15.
The ASPeCT and JFK protocols meet a large set of goals.
Both of these protocols can be easily modified to provide
trust assurance (requiring additional signatures). Both of these
protocols are vulnerable to partial chosen key attacks. How-
ever, in Table III we opt for the possibility that the ASPeCT
and JFK protocols can be modified to meet this goal because
in an AWN all communicating devices may be of the same
computation power and have a strong offline pre-deployment
relationship.
The T2LS protocol meets the trust assurance goal by default.
However, for the remaining goals it has the same results as
the SSL protocol. A point in favour of the SCP81, MM, and
SM protocols is that they were designed for the smart card
industry where there is a strong and centralised organisational
model. Most of these protocols, to some extent, have a
similar architecture, in which a server generates the key and
then communicates that key to the client. There is no non-
repudiation as they do not use signatures in the protocol run.
Both SSH and SSL meet a large set of requirements and
also have the potential to be extended to the additional require-
ments. However, to provide a flexible, backward compatible
and universally acceptable architecture these protocols have
too many optional parameters. Such flexibility is one of the
main causes of most of the issues that these protocols have
been plagued with in the last couple of years, heartbleed being
the most infamous vulnerability.
Asymmetric TKDF (Trusted Key Distribution Frameworks)
does not satisfy a number of requirements. In contrast, P-
STCP satisfies most of the requirements listed in the table.
The only difference between the P-STCP and the proposed
protocol (except for the message structure) is the number of
rounds to successfully complete a protocols run. P-SCTP has
four messages (2-round protocol) and the proposed protocol
uses 3 messages (1.5-round protocol).
As apparent from the table III, the proposed protocol
satisfies all goals that were described in section IV-A.
C. Practical Implementation
In our AWN test-bed each node is a Raspberry Pi model B
supplied with a Wi-Fi USB dongle TL-WN722N by TP-LINK.
In all the measurements we made, the nodes were configured
in ad-hoc mode.
For all the selected protocols, in our evaluation implemen-
tations, we setup two neighboring nodes to establish a secure
channel. This provides a performance measurement of the
protocols between individual communicating pairs. However
for the TKDF, a key distribution server is also required and a
third node in the ad-hoc network plays this role.
Backend platform for measurements
Server
Ethernet 
switch
Ethernet wire
Raspberry Pi equipped 
with a Wi-Fi USB dongle
Secure Channel Protocol
Avionics Wireless Network
Wi-Fi 
eavesdropping
Figure 2. AWN test-bed
In our AWN test-bed, each node is connected to a backend
server by means of an Ethernet connection. This server con-
trols the nodes so as to prepare them for the target scenario
and is also in charge of collecting the measurements. Effective
measurement can be done internally on the node initiating the
secure channel, called a client, and/or it can be done at the
level of the network data exchanged between the nodes of the
AWN and captured with a Wi-Fi card on the backend server
set in monitor mode.
The performance comparison is provided in Table IV,
comparing a subset of protocols from table III and proposed
protocol performance in the developed test-bed environment.
Table IV
PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE MEASURES (MILLISECONDS)
SSL SSH Asymmetric TKDF Proposed Protocol
1310.93 911.21 14447.63 4582.44
Note: Above-mentioned measurement values for SSL, SSH and Asymmetric
TKDF are from [38].
In our Python implementation of the proposed protocol, the
TPM was emulated by the Raspberry Pi. Key sizes used for
our proposed protocol were 2048 bits MODP group for the
Diffie-Hellman key generation, 2048 bits for RSA and 256
bits for symmetric encryption and MAC computation (AES).
The P-STCP protocol was implemented with smaller key
sizes in [10], resulting in 2998.71ms performance measure-
ment. Use the key sizes from [10] in our implementation
results the performance of the proposed protocol to be
1201.50ms.
D. Protocol Verification by CasperFDR
We selected the CasperFDR approach for formal analysis of
the proposed protocol. The Casper compiler [35] takes input
as a high-level description of the protocol, together with its
security requirements along with the definition of an attacker
and its capabilities. The compiler then translates the descrip-
tion into the process algebra of Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) [36]. The CSP description of the protocol can
be machine-verified using the Failures-Divergence Refinement
(FDR) model checker [37]. The intruder’s capability modelled
in the Casper script (appendix A) for the proposed protocol
is:
• an intruder can masquerade any entity in the network,
• an intruder can read the messages transmitted in the
network, and
• an intruder cannot influence the internal process of an
entity in the network.
The security specification for which CasperFDR evaluates
the network is as shown below. The listed specifications are
defined in the #Specification section of appendix A:
• the protocol run is fresh and both applications are alive,
• the key generated by the entity A is known only to the
entity B (A and B are communication partners/devices),
• entities mutually authenticate each other and have mutual
key assurance at the conclusion of the protocol,
• long-term keys of communicating entities are not com-
promised, and
• an intruder is unable to deduce the identities from ob-
serving the protocol messages.
The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocol and did not find
any feasible attack(s). The script is provided in appendix A.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we outlined the concept of the AWN and
discussed why such a proposal requires a secure channel for
communication. The data communicated over an AWN has a
strong requirement for confidentiality and integrity. To satisfy
this requirement, communicating devices should have some
cryptographic secrets to provide confidentiality and integrity.
To generate these cryptographic secrets, the devices run a
secure channel protocol. In this paper, we proposed a secure
channel protocol that not only provides mutual authentications
and key sharing between the communicating entities but also
provides assurance that each of the devices is in a secure and
trusted state. We compared our proposed protocol with a list of
selected protocols and experimental performance results were
provided. Finally, we evaluated the protocol using CasperFDR,
showing that our protocol is secure against a number of
attacks.
In future work, we will explore the major issue of detecting
and neutralising wireless jamming and DoS attackers, along
with building a strong mitigating framework. In addition to the
trusted boot, for robust and reliable security we need to look
into secure execution on AWN nodes - especially investigating
the inclusion of ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX technologies.
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APPENDIX A
CASPERFDR SCRIPT
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num)
unwinding 2
hkAD2, hkAD1, iMsg, rMsg, EnMaKey : Field
AD1, AD2, U: Agent
gAD1, gAD2: Num
nAD1, nAD2, AD1Val, AD2Val: Nonce
VKey: Agent->PublicKey
SKey: Agent->SecretKey
InverseKeys = (VKey, SKey), (EnMaKey,
EnMaKey), (Gen, Gen), (Exp, Exp)
#Protocol description
0. -> AD2 : AD1 [AD1!=AD2] <iMsg :=
Exp(Gen,gAD2)>
1. AD2 -> AD1 : AD2, nAD2, iMsg%hkAD2 <EnMaKey
:= Exp(hkAD2, gAD1); rMsg := Exp(Gen,gAD1)>
2. AD1 -> AD2 : nAD1, rMsg%hkAD1 <EnMaKey :=
Exp(hkAD1, gAD2)>
3. AD2 -> AD1: nAD2, nAD1
4. AD1 -> AD2 : {{rMsg, U,
nAD2}{SKey(U)}}{EnMaKey} [rMsg==hkAD2]
5. AD2 -> AD1 : {{iMsg,AD2,
nAD1}{SKey(AD2)}}{EnMaKey} [iMsg==hkAD1]
6.AD1 -> AD2 : {{AD1OSHash, AD1,
nAD2}{SKey(AD1)}}{EnMaKey}
#Actual variables
ADev1, ADev2, ME: Agent
GAD1, GAD2, GMalicious: Num
NAD1, NAD2, AD1VAL, AD2VAL, NMalicious: Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(AD2,AD1, U, AD2VAL, gAD2, nAD2)knows
SKey(AD2), VKey
READ2ONDER(AD1,AD2, U, AD1VAL, gSC, nSC) knows
SKey(U), SKey(SC), VKey
#System
INITIATOR(ADev2, ADev1,ADev2Val, GAD2, NAD2)
READ2ONDER(ADev1, ADev2, ADev1Val, GAD1, NAD1)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = ME
IntruderKnowledge = {ADev2, ADev2, ME,
GMalicious, NMalicious, SKey(ME), VKey}
#Specification
Aliveness(AD2, AD1)
Aliveness(AD1, AD2)
Agreement(AD2, AD1, [EnMaKey])
Secret(AD2, EnMaKey, [AD1])
Secret(AD1, U, [AD2])
#Equivalences
forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) =
Exp(Exp(Gen, y), x)
